I’ve pointed out on many occasions that the Russians have the capability to launch a strategic offensive in Ukraine basically any time they want to. But what I have not addressed is conditions. What would they want it to look like? How would they know when to “roll tanks?”
Critical to this analysis is just how successful the Russian decision to adopt a “ground and pound” approach to destroying the Armed Forces of Ukraine has been. Despite the full and enthusiastic backing of NATO and a Ukrainian numerical advantage for much of the war, the Russians have maintained a lopsidedly positive loss-exchange ratio against their enemies throughout. Ukraine is going into demographic collapse while Russian society at large has barely noticed the war.
Matt Davies pointed out some time ago that the Stavka has placed a heavy emphasis on efficiency in this war. Many Russian decisions at the operational-strategic level can be explained simply by their seeking the most efficient means to inflict mass casualties on the AFU with the lowest risk to themselves. Thus, any decision to transition to high-speed, mobile warfare from low-speed, positional war can be expected to follow that rubric. In other words, the Russians will launch an offensive to rout the AFU after its back is broken in positional war, rather than attack seeking to “change the game” and defeat the Ukrainians in mobile war. The “game” heavily favors the Russians and they’re not in a rush to change it!
The difference between these scenarios can be seen quite easily by comparing two very successful offensives: Operation Bagration in 1944 and the 1975 Ho Chi Minh Offensive. Bagration routed the once-mighty Army Group Center – at the cost of 180,000 killed in action, three times the total Russian death toll of this war. I’m sure the Russians would much prefer the 8,000-strong butcher’s bill of North Vietnam’s war-ending 1975 operation – and they have the strategic insight to see that modern Ukraine, as a corrupt and deeply dysfunctional garrison state propped up by endless foreign aid, is far more akin to South Vietnam than Nazi Germany.
So what does this look like in practice? The Russians are going to keep poking and prodding in their usual methodical way until part of the line collapses “in depth,” and then all hell is going to break loose. That could actually be quite soon – for instance, the recent Russian maneuver in Kharkov was likely intended to accelerate this timeline – but regardless, the State Department will be warming up their helicopters shortly afterwards.
As an addendum, it’s just occurred to me that the Ukrainian Hundred Days Offensive of summer 2023 could be likened to Lam Son 719 as a poorly conceived and executed offensive maneuver by an army that had no real idea what it was actually getting itself into… perhaps a topic for examination later.
A Note About The Vietnam Comparison
Since Armchair Warlord brought up Vietnam, two quick points about that in relation to the current Ukraine situation.
- It’s worth remembering that the Vietnam War was a proxy war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. As with us and the Ukraine today, Russia poured high-tech weapons into North Vietnam, including fighter aircraft and advanced air defense artillery systems. The U.S. lost more than 12,000 aircraft during the war, including planes, helicopters, and UAVs.Â
- The 1975 Ho Chi Minh Offensive was basically a repeat of the 1972 Easter Offensive by North Vietnam. That one was stopped by the combination of South Vietnamese ground forces and U.S. air power, particularly the new laser-guided bombs that destroyed NVA tanks. In 1975, Congress had cut off all aid and support to South Vietnam, and without U.S. airpower, North Vietnam defeated the South. Presumably, no U.S. airpower would be used to try to stop a Russian offensive in the Ukraine today, but who knows with the current administration.Â
Let’s wrap this up on a brighter note with a brief comment on Novo Nordisk.
